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 Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law School, Washington, DC.
Paradigm shifts in international justice and the duty to 
protect; in search of an action principle
P. Glen*
ABSTRACT
This article places the emerging “responsibility to protect” within the
historical development of international human rights and criminal law, while
also attempting to more fully theorize the responsibility to ensure that it can be
a basis for action in the face of a state’s commission of atrocities against its
citizens. The main point of departure concerns the issue of “right authority” at
that point in time when a coercive intervention is justified. Rather than rely
solely on the Security Council in these situations, this article contends that
unilateral and multilateral action must be countenanced by a fully theorized
“responsibility to protect.” Such action is the only likely action to be taken in
many circumstances, on account of the self-interest of Security Council
members and general apathy towards intervention in the United Nations.
There are solid legal and policy grounds for permitting such interventions and
no compelling arguments to the contrary. Without sanctioning such action, it
is very likely that the responsibility to protect will become just another quaint
theory in international law, irrelevant to on the ground decision-making and
incapable of the protection it was created to provide.
1. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work on the history of scientific development, Thomas Kuhn
described the structure of that development as revolutionary in nature,
occurring at that point in time “in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole
or in part by an incompatible one.”1 The impetus for this paradigm shift is
malfunction – “scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense …
that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration
of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way
... [T]he sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to
revolution.”2 Kuhn himself analogized his conception of the theory and
operation of scientific revolutions to political revolutions, drawing out
parallels in genesis, form and function between the two. The notion of
revolutionary change, or paradigm shifts, itself provides a useful framework to
judge the evolution, current state, and potential future of international human
1 T.S. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions 92 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996)
(1962).
2 Id.
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rights and criminal law. Although the analogy must necessarily be incomplete,
as is the analogy between scientific and political revolutions, it does go a long
way in explaining how the current system of international justice has reached
its present state, and what may need to occur before that system can develop
further.
The central focus of the instant article is on the emerging principle of
the “responsibility to protect,” a principle still in its infancy almost ten years
after its initial iteration. That principle itself is built of discrete smaller
principles, which together build the overarching notion of a “responsibility to
protect,” but for present purposes, this article is concerned only with the
potential recourse to military or other definitive action in the face of a state’s
failure to safeguard its citizens.3 Using Kuhn as the backdrop, this article
argues that the international justice system finds itself again at the threshold of
a paradigm shift, one which, whether the community makes the shift or fails
to make the shift, will have far-reaching consequences for international law
and policy in the twenty-first century. In essence, the international
community, confronted with continuing instances of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and mass atrocities committed by states against their own
populaces, finds itself desperately in need of an “action principle,” a principle
that can motivate and sanction actions by states in the interest of populations
generally.
Despite much political rhetoric and posturing on the international
stage, such a principle still escapes policy-makers and those with the will to
act. This is not surprising considering the myriad interests that are often in
play when members of the international community sit down and attempt to
address specific and concrete realities and situations. Further, it should be
noted at the outset that there may never come a time when a true action
principle is embraced and utilized by members of the international
community. Nonetheless, to cease striving for such a principle would be an
abdication of responsibility by those who have the power to act. As Gareth
Evans has written, “[i]t can only be a matter of time before reports emerge
again, from Central Africa, Central or South Asia, the Balkans, or somewhere
else, of massacres or mass starvation, rape or ethnic cleansing, occurring or
apprehended.”4 It would be nice if, for once, the international community
actually had a plan and a course of action prepared for such occurrences that
could be implemented and undertaken in time to halt the commission of
crimes, rather than to simply wait and dispense post hoc “justice” after the
fact. It is to this aim that the instant article is dedicated.
3 The “responsibility to protect” comprises three distinct responsibilities: the responsibility to react, with
which this article is concerned, and the responsibilities to prevent and rebuild each vitally important in
their own right.
4 G. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L.
Proc. 78, 80 (2004).
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2. REVOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Since the Treaty of Westphalia established the framework of the modern
international order, there have been two major shifts in the world of
international justice that could be construed, in the Kuhnian sense, as
revolutions. The first occurred in the wake of World War Two with the trials
of former political and military leaders of the defeated German and Japanese
sides. The Nuremburg tribunal explicitly disallowed any defense based on
sovereign immunity, “i.e.”, the position prevailing under the Westphalian
conception of the state that a country’s leaders would be immune to
prosecution by other states.5 Although not entirely without precedent, and
there are few innovations in international law and policy that are truly sui
generis, Nuremburg represented a partial replacement of the Westphalian
paradigm with a new paradigm in which state actors could be held accountable
for certain crimes against their populaces. Returning to Kuhn, the paradigm
shift itself is clear, and the fact that the Nuremburg principles only partially
unraveled the sovereignty contemplated by the Treaty of Westphalia does not
discount the revolutionary nature of this moment. Moreover, the malfunction-
as-impetus is also apparent, although the shift is made post hoc – it is not a
systemic malfunction that necessarily led to the shift away from Westphalia,
but that shift occurred because, had the international community failed to make
the shift, the malfunction would have been manifest. Those who committed the
crimes of Nazi Germany could have been freed, and a dangerous precedent
regarding international accountability would have been set.
The basic principle of Nuremburg, that a state’s leaders will be held
accountable for atrocities committed against its citizens, remained in the
consciousness of international law, despite several years of somnolence, and
returned with vigor in the last years of the Twentieth Century. In response to
the atrocities committed during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda, the United Nations established ad hoc tribunals for the trial of those
responsible. More recently, hybrid tribunals have been established in
Cambodia and Sierra Leone. Yet despite the continuing vibrance of the
Nuremburg principle, the international community’s application of that
principle was obviously and decidedly ad hoc – although perpetrators would
be brought to justice, such justice remained dependent on the establishment of
a specific forum for a specific situation.
Thus, the second revolutionary moment occurred at the point when
international justice became institutionalized in the body of the International
Criminal Court. This moment fits more neatly into the Kuhn analogy, as a
“malfunction” was at least implicitly present – the cost and time involved with
5 See G. Robertson QC, Ending Impunity: How International Criminal Law Can Put Tyrants on Trial, 38
Cornell Int’l L.J. (2005) p. 649, pp. 650-656.
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establishing a tribunal anew for each situation warranting justice – and the
paradigm shift towards an institutionalized forum for administering
international criminal justice at least partially replaced the prior system of ad
hoc and national justice. National jurisdictions will continue to have a
significant role to play in the system via the principle of complementarity, and
nothing in the Rome Statute itself bars recourse to hybrid or other forms of ad
hoc tribunals, yet insofar as it does present an entirely new and permanent
forum for the administration of international criminal justice, the ICC is truly
revolutionary in the Kuhnian sense. From its establishment on, and to the
extent that crimes are committed within its temporal and substantive
jurisdiction, it will be charged with the role of investigating violations of
international criminal and humanitarian law, bringing appropriate charges,
and trying the violators. And it will do all this from a permanent seat, with a
full complement of judges, prosecutors, and staff, whose full time job will be
international criminal law.
These first two moments have built off of each other, as the
establishment of the ICC is a direct result of the continuing vitality of the
Nuremburg principles and the international community’s desire to see justice
done when the worst atrocities are committed by state political and military
leaders. So, to, have the cumulative “effects” of these preceding moments
given rise to the current point of crisis in international criminal and human
rights law, where, for the first time, the international community has begun to
question to what extent the atrocities themselves may be halted prior to or
during their commission, rather than simply punished post factum. To
ultimately answer this question, however, means that one must return to the
surviving aspects of Westphalia and rationalize one state’s “meddling” into
the sovereign domain of another state, a course of action effectively rendered
impermissible by the founding document of the current international order,
the United Nations Charter: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state[.]”6
The “malfunction” here is clear – a state’s sovereignty, as
traditionally conceived under the international system, in essence means that
certain ongoing acts will be isolated from review by the international
community, even if, under prevailing norms of international law, the
perpetrators may ultimately be held to account for those atrocities. This
dilemma was noted by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan over the course
of several high-profile appearances and speeches from 1999 through 2001. In
his speech to the Fifty-Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly, Annan
stated that “[s]urely no legal principle – even sovereignty – can ever shield
6 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153, article 2.7.
PARADIGM SHIFTS IN INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE                                                         23
crimes against humanity.”7 In his millennium report issued the following year,
the dilemma was posed in more existential terms: “If humanitarian intervention
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to
a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights
that affect every precept of our common humanity?”8 This course of thought
culminated at the very moment that the new principle of a “responsibility to
protect” became manifest. At his Nobel lecture in 2001, Annan stated
emphatically that the “sovereignty of states must no longer be used as a shield
for gross violations of human rights.”9 That same year, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty issued a report designed to
meet the inherent tension between state sovereignty and the state’s continuing
proclivity to commit atrocities against its own citizens. In the words of one
prominent member, to meet these difficulties, the international community had
“to rethink sovereignty in terms of its essence being not so much control as
responsibility.”10 Thus, we find ourselves in the midst of the third (potentially)
great, although currently incomplete, revolution in international criminal and
human rights law.
3. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM 
2001 THROUGH THE PRESENT
The “responsibility to protect” was the result of the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 report, The Responsibility to
Protect.11 This report, in the course of rethinking sovereignty-as-
responsibility, premised the resulting conception of sovereignty on two basic
principles: “a primary responsibility to protect lies with the state and a
secondary or surrogate responsibility to protect falls to the international
community when the state is unable or unwilling to halt or avert a population
suffering serious harm, whether resulting from internal war, insurgency,
repression or state failure.”12 This conception of state sovereignty envisions a
two-fold conception of state responsibility: a state is internally responsible to
its citizens for the welfare of those citizens, and externally responsible to the
international community for its internal actions.13 In essence, then, the
Commission contemplated a “residual responsibility” on the part of the
7 Secretary-General presents his Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 and GA/
9596 (20 September, 1999).
8 K.A. Annan, We the peoples: The role of the United Nations in the 21st century 48 (2000), G.A.
Resolution 2000, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. a/54/2000 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/
millennium.
9 K. Annan, Nobel Lecture (10 December, 2001).
10 Evans, supra note 4, p. 82.
11 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect (2001).
12 E. McClean, The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law, 13 J. Conflict &
Security L. (2008) pp. 123-127.
13 Id. at 128; C. Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 Am. J.
Int’l L. (2007) p. 99, p. 104.
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international community, to be activated: (1) when a particular state is clearly
either unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility to protect; (2) when a
particular state … is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities; or (3)
where people living outside a particular state are directly threatened by actions
taking place there.14
When this residual responsibility is activated, states in the
international community may take coercive measures as against the offending
state, which “may include political, economic, or judicial measures, and in
extreme – but only in extreme – cases, they may also include military
action.”15 The possibility of military action is central to the instant article, but
as Evans noted, that possibility is accompanied by a number of difficult
questions: “[W]hat is an extreme case? Where should we draw the line in
determining when military intervention is prima facie defensible? What other
conditions or restraints, if any, should apply in determining whether and how
intervention should proceed? Most difficult of all, who makes all these
decisions? Who should have the ultimate authority to determine whether an
intrusion into a sovereign state, involving the use of deadly force on a
potentially massive scale, should actually go ahead?”16 The Commission
established six basic criteria that should govern the question of military
intervention:
1. Just cause (the threshold for action) – military intervention should not be
countenanced unless two potential situations are present: “large-scale loss
of life, actual or apprehended, with or without genocidal intent, that is the
product either of deliberate state action, state neglect or inability to act, or
a failed state situation; or large-scale ‘ethnic-cleansing,’ actual or
apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of
terror, or rape.”17 The Commission also noted that situations of natural
disasters or catastrophes could also provide the catalyst for military
intervention, “when the state concerned is unwilling or unable to cope or
call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened.”18
2. Right intention – “The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other
motives the intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human
suffering.”19
3. Last resort – military intervention must always be an option of last resort:
“Every diplomatic and nonmilitary avenue for the prevention or peaceful
resolution of the humanitarian crisis must have been explored.”20 The
Commission hedged against the interminable delay a strict application of
14 Stahn, supra note 13, p. 104 (citing The responsibility to protect 17).
15 Evans, supra note 4, p. 84.
16 Id.
17 Id. p. 85.
18 Id.
19 Id. pp. 85-86.
20 Id. p. 86.
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a “last resort” principle could lead to, noting that the requirement that
military intervention must be a recourse of last resort “does not necessarily
mean that every such option must literally have been tried and failed; often
there will simply not be the time for that process to work itself out. What
it does mean is that there must be reasonable grounds for believing that, in
all circumstances, if the measure had been attempted it would not have
succeeded.”21
4. Proportionality – “The scale, duration, and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the
humanitarian objectives in question.”22
5. Reasonable prospects – “Military action can only be justified if it stands a
reasonable chance of successfully halting or averting the atrocities or
suffering that triggered the intervention.”23
6. Right authority – the military intervention must derive its invocation from
an international actor with the legal authority to authorize military
interventions into a sovereign state.24
The question of right authority is central to whether the
“responsibility to protect” will ever become an efficacious principle of action.
As Gareth Evans noted in the wake of the Commission’s report, “[w]hen it
comes to authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes, the
argument is compelling that the United Nations, in particular the Security
Council, should be the first port of call. The difficult question – starkly raised
by Kosovo – is whether it should be the last.”25 Thus, although the
Commission’s report made clear that the United Nations should be the first
stop in obtaining authorization to intervene for protection purposes, it did not
foreclose the option that states unilaterally, in coalitions, or under the auspices
of regional organizations, could intervene if the United Nations failed to take
appropriate action.26
The issue of right authority was next taken up by the United Nations’
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, whose mandate
encompassed issues mainly pertaining to institutional reform at the U.N.
Unsurprisingly, then, the focus of the eventually issued report centered on the
primacy of U.N. authorization, specifically via the Security Council.27
“Unlike the Commission [], the panel did not envisage that an international
responsibility to protect could be invoked by coalitions of the able or willing
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. pp. 86-88.
25 Id. pp. 86-87.
26 The responsibility to protect 54-55; see Stahn, supra note 13, at 104; R. J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to
Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What of Implementation?, 19 Harv. Hum Rts. J. (2006) pp.
289-291.
27 See High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility (2004).
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or regional organizations in the absence of Security Council authorization.
The report stressed that the ‘emerging norm’ of a ‘collective international
responsibility to protect’ was only ‘exercisable by the Security Council’ and
only if military intervention was at stake.”28 Again unsurprisingly, this same
tact was presented in Secretary-General Annan’s 2005 report, In Larger
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.29 In this
report, the “[u]se of force was described as an ultima ratio measure that, if
taken, ought to be carried out by the Security Council. The notion of
responsibility to protect was used to constrain, rather than to enable, the use of
force.”30 As Carsten Stahn noted, “the general focus of the report on the
[Security] Council and the silence of the secretary-general on alternative
means of carrying out interventions for purposes of human protection
indicated a general reluctance to accept military action without the Security
Council’s authorization.”31
Nonetheless, despite the United Nations own attempts to maintain
not only a focus on the Security Council, but a monopoly of decision, gray
area was restored to the “right authority” debate via the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document, the product of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the
60th Session of the General Assembly.32 The relevant provisions of that
document are paragraphs 138 and 139, which embody the responsibility to
protect and contemplate the circumstances when the residual responsibility of
the international community may be activated. Paragraph 138 recognizes that
“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.” Turning from the
state’s internal responsibilities, paragraph 139 addresses the external
dimension of the state’s responsibility: “The international community,
through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” When
that responsibility comes into play, the international community should be
“prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through
the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII,
on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and
28 Stahn, supra note 13, p. 106.
29 See Report of the Secretary General, in Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for All (2005).
30 Stahn, supra note 13, at 107.
31 Id. pp. 107-08.
32 G.A. Res. 60/1 (24, October, 2005).
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national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”33
The Outcome Document does not, contrary to the previous iterations
by Annan and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,
“firmly state that UN collective security action constitutes the only option for
responding to mass atrocities through the use of force ... It leaves the door
open to unilateral response through its ‘case-by-case’ vision of collective
security and qualified commitment to act in cooperation with regional
organizations (‘as appropriate’).”34 Another commentator has posited that
unilateral intervention may be contemplated upon the satisfaction of three
conditions: (1) one of a narrow set of “extreme human rights abuses” is
present; (2) a course of international action has been exhausted or is infeasible
(“the agreement implies a hierarchy of actors and of interventions: Good faith
U.N. action is privileged over unilateralism and peaceful action is privileged
over violent means.”); and (3) the intervention is undertaken solely for
purposes of protection.35
Although the circumstances that may warrant a military intervention
in the face of a state’s failure to protect its own citizens are more or less clear,
the course of conduct contemplated once those circumstances become
apparent is less so. The four documents explored above diverge in this regard,
with some contemplating potential unilateral or multilateral action outside the
confines of the U.N. system if that system itself is unable to take the
appropriate steps, while others view the U.N. as the sole permissible step on
the enforcement side of the responsibility to protect. Unfortunately, until this
dilemma is resolved, there is little reason to believe that the responsibility to
protect, no matter how beautifully theorized, will have any relevance in
practice.
4. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: AN 
EARLY FAILURE
Whether in the Congo, Sudan, Burma, or any of a range of other states, the
responsibility to protect has failed as a principle in motivating a response to a
state’s clear abdication of its internal responsibility to protect its citizens. This
failure can be attributed to a number of causes, including a lack of clear support
for the principle in practice, “i.e.” a lack of political will for broad
implementation, an incompletely and potential incorrectly theorized view of
the “responsibility,” and the pervasiveness at the United Nations and in foreign
delegations of a paper culture antithetical to definitive action.
33 Id. at p. 139.
34 Stahn, supra note 13, p. 109.
35 See A. L. Bannon, The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World Summit and the Question of
Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. (2006) pp. 1157-1158.
28       UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LAW JOURNAL                                    DECEMBER  2010
First, it is far from clear that there is currently, or ever will be,
sufficient political will to make the responsibility to protect a political reality
in those situations where its invocation would be needed. This is a distinct
issue from those circumstances which present a need for invocation of the
principle, but where action may be impossible from a logistical or operational
perspective. The failure here is starker, as the international community could
do something, but for failure to adequately mobilize political resources does
not. The situation in Darfur is often viewed through this prism, as operational
capacity has never been a real concern in planning on the ground aid and
action. Rather, one of the many lessons of Darfur is that “even if operational
targets can be met, they will not be met without political commitment.”36 This
situation, a failure of political will despite the capacity to act, is not particular
to Darfur, but will infect every circumstance where the responsibility to
protect is invoked, and this is true for a range of reasons, from individual
apathy in the populations of other states to self-interest on the part of
governments and international actors.37 A failure of political commitment is
fatal in these situations, as there is nothing outside the very imperative to
action that these situations cry out for that can compel action on the part of
states or international bodies. Yet unless this situation can be remedied, the
enunciation of the “responsibility to protect” may well “merely mark the turn
of another century of inaction in the face of mass human suffering.”38
Second, it is also not clear that the principle has achieved any sort of
real consensus regarding its scope and implementation in theory, making any
practical application that much more difficult. Emma McLean has noted that
“the change in language advocated by the ICISS report has done little to forge
consensus or overcome the struggle between sovereignty and human
rights.”39 Despite paying lip-service to the responsibility to protect, many
states still wish to maintain rigidly classic definitions of sovereignty, whether
so they can keep a tight grasp on regions seeking independence, or because
they simply want outside eyes averted from domestic issues. This inevitably
means that the responsibility to protect cannot gain hard legal traction, as it
remains simply a principle, or a soft law ideal, yet to coalesce around a
definitive consensus of when and how sovereignty can be “side-stepped” in
favor of international action.40 Although the responsibility to protect itself
should probably never become such a hard principle of law, as that would
36 Hamilton, supra note 26, p. 294.
37 See G. Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. (2006)
pp. 703-720.
38 Hamilton, supra note 26, at 297.
39 McLean, supra note 12, p. 134 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
40 See, “e.g” id. at p. 135 (“At this juncture it is pertinent to recall that the responsibility to protect is not a
legal principle. It is a policy option which the ICISS grounds on four pillars to support the position that a
norm of intervention for human protection purposes in extreme cases of major harm to civilians is
emerging.”); Stahn, supra note 13, p. 120 (“Responsibility to protect is in many ways still a political
catchword rather than a legal norm.”).
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implicate the (unwise) establishment of a coercive regime for incidences of
non-action,41 the foundations of the responsibility must rest on such hard legal
“facts.” Such legal facts must include the extent of a state’s sovereignty and
when sovereignty can cease to act as a cover for a state’s treatment of its own
citizens, the circumstances when militarily coercive action can be resorted to,
and what the nature of the military response could be, “i.e.” international,
unilateral, multilateral, regional. Until these definitional and legal issues are
sorted out, the responsibility to protect will remain not only a point of soft
law, but, for all intents and purposes, simple and superfluous verbiage.
Finally, despite any number of hortatory declarations of support,
implementation of the principle is inevitably compromised by the fact that its
implementation rests with an organization that largely finds written reports,
reprimands, and censures sufficient to discharge its responsibility without
getting its hands dirty with real action. The United Nations and any number of
foreign ministries, including the United States Department of State, are paper
cultures intricably bound to notions of bureaucracy and the interminable delay
inherent therein. Thus, while many trumpet the idea of a responsibility to
protect, there is little reason to believe that this responsibility will ever be put
into action, as the individuals with the responsibility to act must go through
any number of paper exchanges and reports before action could actually be
countenanced. Indicative of this mindset are two recently issued reports, one
by the United Nations, the other by the International Human Rights Clinic of
Harvard Law School. The Harvard report dealt with the issue of international
crimes being committed in Burma, and was overseen by veritable
international jurists, among them, Richard Goldstone, Patricia Wald, and Sir
Geoffrey Nice.42 The report noted the consistent course of grave violations of
human rights law undertaken by Burma’s military junta, and the fact that such
violations had been extensively documented by the United Nations over the
preceding decades in a range of reports and resolutions.43 Noting these
reports, however, the report did not question the efficacy of the United
Nations, or advocate for actual action. Rather, it recommended recourse
through the United Nations Security Council; specifically, that the U.N.
should pass resolutions condemning the situation, the Security Council should
establish a Commission of Inquiry to verify the violations, and then the
Security Council should establish a judicial mechanism or refer the case to the
International Criminal Court to address the violations.44 It seems an odd
conclusion to recommend further reports as the definitive action, when that
41 See Stahn, supra note 13, p. 117 (“If the responsibility to protect were indeed a primary legal norm of
international law, it would be logical to assume that such violations should entail some form of legal
sanction in case of noncompliance. But it is uncertain on what basis and under which rules such violations
could be remedied.”).
42 See International Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law School, Crimes in Burma (May 2009).
43 See id. pp. 3-4, pp. 37-76.
44 Id. p. 77 and pp. 86-90.
30       UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LAW JOURNAL                                    DECEMBER  2010
very conclusion was derived from decades of reports that have obviously not
impacted the situation in Burma at all.
This same flawed logic and lack of self-awareness is even more
present in the Secretary-General’s report on “implementing” the responsibility
to protect.45 The Secretary-General correctly noted, regarding genocide, that
“[t]oo often, the international response has been inadequate. Far from being
consigned to history, genocide remains a serious threat. Not just vigilance but
a will to act are as important today as ever.”46 Nonetheless, any directive to
act is almost immediately undermined in the same paragraph: “To this effect,
my Special Advisor and his office continue to pursue a strategy of enhancing
the United Nations’ understanding of genocide and its precursors, of
strengthening the ways in which existing international law can be used to
prevent genocide and, above all, of monitoring and analyzing ongoing
situations of concern and advising me and Member States as needed.”47 This
inaction is manifest even in the monitoring of actual, rather than apprehended,
incidents. Regarding the breakdown in the Congo, “[t]hroughout 2008, my
Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide has followed the situation in
the eastern DRC … with considerable concern ... From his meetings and
observations, my Special Advisor concluded that there is cause for deep
concern regarding the grave human rights and humanitarian situation in
North Kivu, including the risk of genocidal violence[.]”48 The basic thrust of
this report is the establishment of a framework of analysis “to determine
whether there may be a risk of genocide in a certain situation.”49
The framework uses eight questions to prompt information
collection and analysis of key areas: (1) the existence and
vulnerability of national, ethnic, racial or religious group(s); (2)
human rights violations committed against the group(s); (3)
domestic capacity to prevent genocide; (4) the existence of armed
opposition actors; (5) the existence of any significant political or
economic motivation encouraging political leads to stroke divisions
between groups; (6) whether elements of the crime of genocide are
already occurring; (7) whether there are moments of particular
vulnerability approaching; and (8) whether there is a discernible
intent to commit to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious
population group.50
45 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect—Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, January 2009,
21 Int’l J. Refugee L. 519 (2009).
46 Id. p. 536.
47 Id.
48 Id. p. 531.
49 Id. at 519-20.
50 Id. at p. 520, pp. 522-24.
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One can imagine a genocide being completed in the time that the
United Nations will take to answer these questions which, it bears mentioning,
will only “prompt information collection and analysis” even if a risk of
genocide is apprehended! The kind of analysis and assessment noted by the
United Nations, and undertaken by the Harvard clinic, are important and have
a place within the international justice framework. At some point, however,
the proliferation of reports cannot help but have a deleterious impact on the
will to act, as seems clearly the case at this stage in the development of the
responsibility to protect. Too many actors and policy makers seem content on
writing about why and in what situations the responsibility should be engaged,
rather than in undertaking the necessary steps to ensure implementation on the
ground. Yet, as is obvious, no matter how beautiful the language or theory of
the responsibility is, if it cannot protect in practice, it is not worth the paper
these reports are written on. As Gareth Evans has written, “[w]e cannot be
content with reports and declaration. We must, as an international community,
be prepared to act. We will not be able to live with ourselves if we do not.”51
5. TOWARDS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION
If the responsibility to protect, as currently conceived and implemented, is
flawed and incapable of realizing its inherent promise, how can the
international community proceed towards a principle of action that can provide
the requisite impetus in a Darfur or Burma? In order to realize such a principle
of action, the responsibility to protect simply has to be more tightly and
coherently theorized, specifically in relation to the types of overtly coercive
responses it will countenance under its name, “i.e.” how military action may be
undertaken. This may be the most important aspect regarding moving forward,
but all the hard legal “facts” noted in the preceding section must be dealt with
explicitly and comprehensively, which has only occurred to a limited degree
thus far. Specifically, the limitations on a state’s sovereignty must be
addressed, the circumstances warranting an overt and physical response must
be categorized, and the permissible nature of that response must be delineated.
As an initial matter, however, the “theory” of the international
community’s residual responsibility must be more fully developed. The
“responsibility to protect” asserts that a state has an internal responsibility to
protect its citizens, and an external responsibility to the international
community to assure that it does fulfill its domestic responsibilities.52 Only
when the state shirks the internal dimension of its responsibility may the
international community’s responsibility be engaged. Rather than view the
international community’s “residual” responsibility as derivative of the state’s
51 Evans, supra note 4, p. 89.
52 See McClean, supra note 13, at 128; Stahn, supra note 14, p. 104.
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internal responsibility, that responsibility should derive directly from the
corpus of international human rights and criminal law, “i.e.” the international
community has a responsibility to enforce a state’s compliance with its
obligations under international law, and when a state fails to fulfill those
mandates, coercive action by the international community is permissible.
Although a state does have an external responsibility to the international
community to ensure its own compliance with its international obligations,
this responsibility is not one which implicates the domestic populace or
should engage any international responsibility. It is a traditional state-to-state
conception of responsibility, and recourse for violations in that sense should
be confined to traditional avenues of international dispute settlement. Any
responsibility undergirding the international community’s call to action in
“responsibility to protect” situations should be based not on this external
dimension of the state’s responsibility, but on the international community’s
duty to ensure compliance with international law. 
Regarding limitations on a state’s sovereignty, it is still accepted that
so long as a state complies with its obligations to its citizens, its internal
actions will avoid external scrutiny. There is a growing consensus, however,
that when this responsibility is neglected, any defense to external scrutiny
based on sovereignty is weak, at best. This fact is derived from the legal
obligations undertaken by the state on behalf of its citizens, and the
understanding that a state may not commit atrocities against its subject
populace: “If nations have no sovereign right to commit or passively permit
atrocities against their own populations, then they cannot object on
sovereignty grounds to coercive actions halting the commission of those
atrocities.”53 Thus, the issue of sovereignty need not be dealt with in a
necessarily expansive manner. It is sufficient, for purposes of discerning when
action is warranted, to address solely those grave circumstances where the
state is actively committing atrocities against its populace. In those
circumstances, a state simply does not have any cognizable defense to
intervention, as it is itself committing crimes under international law which
the intervention is designed to stop. Accordingly, this provides the first legal
peg of support for a principle of action: action can proceed against a state that
is committing crimes against its population in violation of international law,
because that state lacks any colorable sovereignty defense.
But what crimes will trigger this “abrogation” of sovereignty?
Any inclination towards adventurism on the part of the members of
the international community can be tempered by making clear that a military
intervention will only be triggered by the worst abuses of a state. Election
fraud or electoral corruption would be an insufficient basis to justify a military
response, making action unjustified based on the recent elections in Iran and
53 Bannon, supra note 35, p. 1162.
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the previous disputed elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Violations of other
human rights, “i.e.” religious freedom, rights of association, freedoms of
speech and the press, are also not actions that should trigger an overt military
response. This is not to say that these rights are not extraordinarily important
or that some other form of coercive response should not be contemplated and
implemented – it is solely to recognize that not every violation of a right
cognizable under international law can give rise to the most extreme response.
Rather, the ICISS report has basically gotten it right in categorizing those
circumstances where a state’s actions against its citizens will give rise to
colorable grounds for military intervention: where there is “large-scale loss of
life, actual or apprehended, with or without genocidal intent, that is the
product either of deliberate state action, state neglect or inability to act, or a
failed state situation; or large-scale ‘ethnic-cleansing,’ actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.”54
Additionally, intervention will be countenanced when a state is unwilling or
unable to take necessary steps to protect its populace in the wake of a natural
disaster or catastrophe.55 Burma’s inexcusable delay and ultimately
ineffectual response to Cyclone Nargis is just such an example.
To this list should be added a state’s commission of crimes against
humanity, as defined by the Rome Statute. This would include as a trigger for
a military response a state’s commission of enslavement, deportation or
forcible transfers of segments of the population, torture, persecution, state-
sponsored disappearances, and other inhumane acts of a similar character.56
Although these acts are justifiably seen as reprehensible, the criticism may be
leveled that to include crimes against humanity as a trigger for military action
increases exponentially those circumstances where such action could be
justified. The line between persecution and deprivation of religious freedoms,
for instance, may be gray, and there are no good reasons for including crimes
against humanity on the one hand, while excluding similarly egregious
violations of human rights on the other. In practice, and in correctly applying
the definition of crimes against humanity, including this class should not
unduly expand the range of circumstances where a military action may be
countenanced, mainly on account of the inherent jurisdictional limitation of
“crimes against humanity.” The acts noted above are not crimes against
humanity when viewed in isolation, or necessarily even when viewed in the
aggregate: rather, to constitute crimes against humanity, a state must be
committing the listed acts, and the state’s commission of those acts must be
widespread or systematic, and the attacks must be directed at a civilian
54 Evans, supra note 4, p. 85.
55 Id.
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1) (b), U.N. Doc. 1998, A/CONF. 183/9 (1 July,
2002).
34       UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA LAW JOURNAL                                    DECEMBER  2010
population.57 Considering the prevailing international law definitions of
“widespread” and “systematic,” it is unlikely that including crimes against
humanity as a trigger to action would lead to action in any but the most
egregious circumstances.58 Thus, once a state’s sovereignty has been pierced
by its commission of atrocities against its citizens, military action can be
countenanced if those atrocities constitute genocide or mass killings, or crimes
against humanity, or if the state fails to take reasonable responsive action in the
face of a natural disaster or catastrophe to the significant detriment of its
population. This is the second legal peg on which any claim of military action
must be hung.
This leaves, of course, perhaps the most contentious aspect of any
principle of action – when can action be resorted to and who is charged with
the responsibility of acting?
Much of the debate over the “responsibility to protect” has taken
place within the context of “growing concerns as to the effectiveness of the
[United Nations], in particular the Security Council, to respond to genocide,
ethnic cleansing and other mass human rights violations.”59 The United
Nations generally, and the Security Council specifically, proved ineffectual in
the face of genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing and forced displacements
of persons in Kosovo, and has thus far failed to act with any sort of efficacy in
Sudan, Burma or Congo. Yet the fact remains that the United Nations and the
Security Council are the preeminent legal-political institutions under
international law, for better or for worse, and thus, there is a compelling
argument that before any military action can be undertaken, the Security
Council must be consulted.60 Nonetheless, there are also compelling reasons
for not consulting the Security Council. Its members vested interests may
often block definitive action in a state where action is sorely needed, such as
in Darfur, where China has substantial oil interests in Sudan and is loathe to
risk those interests on humanitarian grounds. Self-interest leads to two distinct
problems. First, self-interest, if it proceeds through incrementalism, may delay
any action by the Security Council until far past the time when action could
have been efficacious in halting the commission of atrocities. Second, if self-
interest leads to a more definitive refusal of action, say through an explicit
veto of a contemplated course of action, the Security Council’s refusal to act
will inevitably call into question any actions that are ultimately contemplated
or undertaken by a state singularly or in a coalition of other like-minded actors
57 Id. at article. 7(1).
58 See, “e.g.” Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 69 (6 December, 1999)
(“‘widespread,’ as an element of crimes against humanity, was defined in the Akayesu Judgment, as
massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed
against a multiplicity of victims, whilst ‘systematic’ was defined as thoroughly organised action,
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy and involving substantial public or private
resources.”).
59 McLean, supra note 13, p. 124.
60 See Evans, supra note 4, pp. 86-87.
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in the wake of the United Nations’ failure to act. Thus, a pall may be cast over
any eventual action. Of course, delay may become manifest even if no self-
interest problems are present. As noted previously, the United Nations is
largely a paper culture, and so even if the Security Council may be inclined
towards action, no action will be implemented until a significant number of
rounds of investigation, reporting, and debate have taken place. As with the
“analysis of genocide” proposed by the Secretary-General in his report on
implementing the responsibility to protect, one can very well image the
completion of genocide or crimes against humanity in the time it may take the
Security Council to act.
This article is not the place to argue for comprehensive United
Nations’ reform or for a position that would blatantly ignore that body’s
prerogatives regarding international law and intervention. Nonetheless, it is
clear that some mechanism must be put into place that will assure at least the
possibility of a course of action in the face of United Nations inaction. Thus,
recourse to unilateralism and multilateralism must be countenanced by a fully
theorized responsibility to protect. The main question that needs to be
answered in that context, then, is when can such action be resorted to?
Assuming for purposes of this article that the Security Council, or,
more generally, the United Nations, should be the first stop in seeking
sanction for the use of military action against a state that has failed in its
responsibility to protect, alternative courses of action should be permitted
when it becomes apparent that the Security Council is either unable or
unwilling to act. Thus, there needs to be a requirement of exhausting available
U.N. remedies prior to undertaking a unilateral or multilateral response, but
the exhaustion requirement has to be read in a pragmatic, not formal sense. In
line with Gareth Evans, it is not necessary that every potential remedial course
via the Security Council be attempted and fail prior to undertaking alternative
courses of action – a state ready to take action need only be certain that all
international courses have been explored and have either failed or further
attempts would be futile.61 This is a necessarily subjective test – when further
courses of action will be deemed futile will obviously depend on the
perspective of the state seeking sanction for action, and there is, unfortunately,
no bright-line rule for when, in any given situation, the Security Council has
become “irrelevant.” To require some level of exhaustion, however, assures
that the United Nations will be the first stop in seeking sanction to any
military action, which should, in turn, assure that body a place in the debate
about whether coercive military action is justified and provide it with an
opportunity to undertake its obligation to protect subjugated populaces.
If, however, it fails in this obligation, as seems increasingly likely
given its track record over the preceding decades, the responsibility to protect
61 Id. p. 86.
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must be theorized in such a way as to provide explicit legal cover for action on
the part of single states, multilateral coalitions, or regional actors. In most
circumstances, these types of responses will be all that is available, either
because of self-interest on the part of Security Council members or the general
apathy at the United Nations towards action. The failure of the United Nations
to act, however, should not be an obstacle in the road to others exercising their
responsibility to protect. Nor are there any fatal criticisms to allowing
unilateral or multilateral action in these circumstances. Unilateralism is
almost a non-starter, as there are few, if any countries, with the ability to
intervene unilaterally in the circumstances contemplated by the responsibility
to protect. The United States, perhaps the only country with both the resources
and will to undertake such interventions, is reeling from two current wars and
is unlikely to undertake, unilaterally, any new obligations. In any event, any
eventual action is still constricted by threshold requirements that would have
to be met, even if unilateral or multilateral action is taken outside the confines
of Security Council sanction. Permitting such action does not create a “wild
west” type of atmosphere where any gunslinger-country can ride to the rescue
of an afflicted population. Such intervention can only occur once a state has
failed in its own duty to protect its citizens, and the actions being undertaken
in that state rise to the requisite level of severity to warrant forcible
intervention. In short, the responsibility does not grant a carte blanche to
willing states. Additionally, so long as the responsibility is grounded on the
legal pegs noted above, no claim can be made that the intervention itself, even
if it does occur through a “coalition of the willing” rather than under the
auspices of the U.N. blue hats, is impermissible. Any intervention will occur
only under the legal principles that sovereignty is limited, and that the
offending state’s sovereignty has been pierced by its active commission of
heinous crimes against its own population. Finally, and also unfortunately,
self-interest, when present, will likely act against the principle of intervention,
not in favor of action.
The Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq has done much to temper
the international community’s desire to intervene in humanitarian situations.
This is unfortunate, not least so because any humanitarian justification for that
invasion was decidedly post hoc and not relevant to the initial decision to
invade.62 Those with the power to act now cannot be lead astray by the hang-
over of that “misadventure.” Action outside the Security Council in
responsibility to protect situations must be sanctioned, as in the bulk of such
situations that will be the only true action that is likely to occur. This is
embarrassingly apparent from shots of U.N. “peacekeepers” standing by in the
midst of the Rwandan genocide, to NATO’s lead role in Kosovo after the
Security Council’s inexcusable abdication of responsibility, and to the lead
62 P. Wolfowtiz, Realism, Foreign Pol’y, September-October. 2009, pp. 66-72.
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role of African states and regional organizations in Congo and Darfur. If the
responsibility to protect is to attain the status of an action principle, then U.N.-
fetishism must be jettisoned in favor of a more pragmatic outlook on
international law and policy. Sanctioning the types of alternative action
contemplated by this article, and in those circumstances where such action is
warranted, would go a long way in making such an action principle a reality.
6. CONCLUSION
There is a serious malfunction in the current operation of international human
rights and criminal law, as states continue to commit mass atrocities against
their own populations. Although the “responsibility to protect” does represent
a partial shift away from the prevailing paradigm, whereby a state is largely
unaccountable during the commission of such acts, it has thus far been
ineffectual in marshaling action against offending states. This is so for a
number of reasons, but most importantly because implementation of a plan of
action is too dependent on the United Nations and the Security Council. If a
true “action principle” is to be realized in the near future, unilateral and
multilateral action in the face of United Nations inaction must be sanctioned by
the international community. The fears surrounding such a move are largely
unfounded and, in any event, the potential gains to be realized far outweigh any
of the associated costs. Although some have sought a balancing in these
situations, weighing the harm to the Security Council if action is undertaken
outside its purview against the harm to populations in the face of non-action,
there is another dimension to this analysis, namely the harm to the international
system when states are permitted to flaunt international law with impunity in
the commission of crimes against their populations. Darfur, Burma, and North
Korea, to name a few, are horrendous situations not only for the human cost
associated with the regimes’ misdeeds, but also because the very existence of
these regimes seems a repudiation of those human rights that have grounded
the international order since the birth of the United Nations. Now is finally the
time for action and the time to cease hiding behind reports and other
instruments of interminable delay. For if we fail to act now, in light of decades
of accumulated knowledge, “we will not be able to live with ourselves.”63
63 Evans, supra note 4, p. 89.
